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When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course
I. The Problem and the Method
The purpose of this chapter is to obtain information on the relation
of U.S. exports to U.S. business cycles by focusing on cyclical turning
points. In order to find out whether export peaks match business
cycle peaks, or troughs, or neither, and whether domestic business
cycle (DBC) turns cause export turns or vice versa, we must, of course,
try to ascertain the role of the main factors other than the DBC
in reversing exports. Thus the influence of turns in foreign demand
must be examined and, in some cases, independent fluctuations in
supply may also require attention.
The various possible relations between exports and DBC have been
discussed in Chapter 1. Applied to turning points, this analysis leads
to the following conclusions: Export troughs may be associated with
DBC troughs for two reasons. The first is that the upturn in exports
pulls the economy out of recession; the second is that a trough in
foreign demand coincides with a U.S. business cycle trough. On the
other hand, an export trough may occur near the DBC peak due
to the favorable effect of a decline in domestic demand on exports.
Export peaks may similarly be associated either with peaks or with
troughs in the DBC. Only empirical investigation can ascertain the
actual relationships, their shifts over time, and their variations by
classes of export commodities. This is no simple matter, however.
Most export series are choppy, which makes dating of turning points
difficult. Decisions also depend in some instances, to an uncomfortable
extent, on the validity of the adjustment for enormous seasonal varia-
tions. Once the turns are selected, they must be matched like
turns in world import cycles ('WIG, also referred to simply as world
cycles), and in DBC, and also with unlike turns in DBG. To avoid
arbitrary decisions, this matching has been reduced, as far as possible,
to an objective basis. It is done by National Bureau experts who
are guided by a set of rules developed by Burns and Mitchell and
adapted by me for this particular purpose. (See Appendix D.)116 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
Considerable insights into the causes of export turns are gained
when the several timing measures are used in combination. Since
some turns in the WIG are far apart from those in the DBC, the sepa-
rate impact of the two cycles can be observed and these observations
applied in interpreting the remaining instances. The explanation of
export turns is also greatly assisted by observation of corresponding
turns in export prices. Simultaneous like turns in export prices and
quantity support the attribution of turns in export quantity to WIC
turns, while inverse price-to-quantity turns imply that the latter are
caused by change in domestic demand.
Findings about export turns must, of course, be combined with
findings about other aspects of export movements, e.g., rates of change,
which will be sought by more formal methods in the following chap-
ters. However, though of limited scope, the timing analysis lays the
groundwork for the more general approach. In contrast to measures
of average relationship, it copes with the special problem of export
analysis: the possibility of alternately positive and inverse relations
between business cycles and exports.
The analysis deals primarily with export quantities their
movements reflect the causal factors more clearly than those of values.
For instance, a peak in the DBC may be associated with a peak
in export prices and a trough in export quantities, while export
values may fail to turn up as the fall in prices offsets the rise in
quantities. Quantity turns thus yield a clearer picture, particularly
when the inverse DBC effect plays a large role.
Since, however, divergence of quantity from value turns is the
exception rather than the rule, the findings about the former also
fit the latter in most instances. Nearly two out of every three value
turns coincide exactly with their quantity counterpart and four out
of five coincide at least roughly (i.e., are not more than one quarter
apart)
Thefrequent coincidence of value and quantity turns is due largely
to the relative mildness of price movements. It is for this reason
that price turns, which typically do not coincide with like quantity
turns, rarely bring about a turn in export value, while most quantity
turns cause value turns. The behavior of prices also is not responsible
for systematic leads or lags of values relative to quantities. Sometimes
prices continue to rise or fall for a while after volume has begun
to decline or to expand. In such cases value lags behind quantity.
1AfterWorld War II, twenty-seven out of thirty turns coincide.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 117
But in other instances prices lead, and the value turn precedes that
in quantity.
That export quantity turns coincide so frequently with export value
turns and neither lead nor lag behind them systematically is important
for the evaluation of leads and lags of export quantities at world
import turns. Since the series used represents the value, not the
quantity, of world imports, divergence between value and quantity
turns would affect the timing measures. As itis, however, no such
bias is likely, though individual measures may, of course, differ some-
what from what they would have been if a world quantity series
had been used.
2. Foreign Demand as Cause of Extort Turns
a. ASSOCIATION OF EXPORT TURNS WITH TURNS IN WORLD IMPORTS
The most important factor causing U.S. exports to reverse their
directionisturning points in world demand. Hence an analysis
of the relation between export turns and world import cycle turns
may usefully precede the discussion of the timing of export turns
at DBC turns. In addition, the timing of exports at WIC turns is
interesting in its own right.
During the full period covered, there are twenty-eight turns in
world imports, fourteen before World War I and fourteen thereafter.
Without exception, these reversals in world imports were accom-
panied by like turns in total export quantity and value, and in the
grea,t majority of instances, also by turns in each of the commodity
classes. Out of ninety-eight observations on these classes, export quan-
tities turned eighty-five times at WIG turns and export value eighty-
seven times (Table 14). In view of the innumerable special factors
which at one time or another affect a particular class of export
goods, also the probable countereffect of the DBC, and finally the
likelihood of errors in the choice of turning dates, this proportion
of corresponding turns is striking. It is even more so when we note
that about half of these related turns in export quantity and value
coincide roughly with the world turn, i.e., occur not more than one
quarter earlier or later.2
Of those thirteen instances in which an export quantity series failed
to turn when world imports did, six are turns missed by finished manu-
2Thepercentage of coincident peaks is almost the same as given above for all
turns combined. The percentage of coincident troughsis higher inthelater
and lower in the earlier years.118 Cyclical Fluctuations• in U.S. Exports
TABLE 14
Timing of Twenty-Eight Turns in World Impcrt Cycles (WIC) Related


























No. of WIC turns.
relatedtoEQturns28 22 14 24 25 85
Roughly coincidenta15 10 8 12 10 40
Lead or lag by two
or more quarters 13 12 6 12 15 45
No. of WIC turns not
related toEQturns0 6 0 4 3 13
No.of EQ turns not
relatedtoWlC turns8 2 4 22 15 43
Export Values
No. of WIC turns
relatedtoEVturns28 22 14 26 25 87
Roughlycoincidenta21 10 10 15 14 49
Lead or lag by two
morequarters 7 12 4 11 11 38
No.of WIC turns not
relatedtoEVturns 0 6 0 2 3 11
No.of EV turns not
relatedtoWlC turns 8 0 2 14 16 32
Based on seasonally adjustedquarterly series.
Worldimports exclude U.S. imports.
Datafor 193.3-38 are in dollars of 1930 parity, otherwise in current
dollars.
Military. grant aid is excluded from exports beginnthg with the third
quarter of 1950.
Coverage: See turns in Tables 15-22.
ainterval of one quarter or less.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 119
factures due to their strong upward trend which caused them to skip
mild world cycles before 1913 as well as in the 1920's. The others
are cases where crude materials or food exports moved differently
from WIC.
The emphasis so far on the correspondence between export and
world import turns must not mislead us, however. The rule that
exports turn when world demand turns is not reversible, and there
are many peaks and troughs in exports which cannot be explained
by WIC. Within the period covered by WIC, there are forty in-
stances where an export value series and fifty-one instances where
an export quantity series reverses itself without relation to a cor-
responding WIC turn. This amounts to 26 and Si per cent, respec-
tively, of all such export turns. In some instances these noncorre-
sponding export cycles have a counterpart in a mild swing of the
slow-moving world imports. But often they do reflect independent
swings with amplitudes which sometimes exceed those of the matched
cycles.
That the number of these extra cycles is larger for quantity than
for value is not due to chance. It indicates that value movements
in some cases are milder than those of quantity, which implies that
price changes are in the opposite direction. Inverse price-to-quantity
changes suggest the influence of domestic factors. The extent to which
the extra export cycles are due to domestic business fluctuations will
be investigated below. First, however, we must take a closer look
at the behavior of exports at world import turns.
b. LEADS AND LAGS OF EXPORTS AT WORLD CYCLE TURNS
Do U.S. exports recover and slump earlier or later than world
imports? The answer depends on the commodity class considered; it
also differs for the lower and the upper turning points. However,
the timing of a given class of goods is fairly consistent at all peaks
or all troughs over the long span covered (Tables 15—22). When
all quantity classes are lumped together, leads are nearly twice as
frequent as lags since some series typically begin to fall before world
imports have reached their peak while improvement in others regu-
larly precedes the WIG trough. Lags are typical only of food exports
at troughs before 1913.
The interval between turning points in U.S. exports and world
imports is, in most instances, brief. There are only a few medians
of two quarters or more, all before 1913. Value turns are even closer
to WIG turns than those in quantity (Tables 19—22), another indica-120 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
tion of the fact that export value (EV) movements, due to the con-
formity of export prices to WIG, agree even better with WIG than
export quantity (EQ) movements. (This is also shown by the smaller
number of extra EV turns and by measures of conformity, etc.)
Exports of semimanufactures, crude materials, and. foods usually
begin to decline before world imports do. From 1881 to 1959, the
value of exports of these classes leads at the WIG peak in twenty-
two instances, the quantity in twenty-five. By contrast, there are merely
six and seven lags. Foods, which are the first to slump, also are the
last to recover and lag in most instances at WIG troughs in the
earlier period. In later years, their timing at WIC troughs becomes
irregular.4
Revival of crude materials exports sometimes precedes and some-
times follows that in world imports. This irregularity and the rel-
atively long intervals indicate that correspondence between troughs
in such exports and in WIC is not close.
The timing of exports of finished manufactures differs from that
of other Resumption of growth occurs more quickly, slacken-
ing more slowly. At WIG peaks before 1913, this means that average
leads of finished manufactures export quantity (MEQ) are shorter than
those of other classes. In the later period, lags become as frequent as
leads, and the median interval between peaks in MEQ or MEV and
WIG peaks is zero. The. contrast between exports of manufactures and
other classes is most pronounced at WIC troughs before 1913. While
other classes lag, manufactures lead, particularly in terms of quantity.
On the average, MEQ starts rising more than two and a half quarters
earlier than world imports. At later world troughs, the role of leader
is' taken over by semimanufactures while finished manufactures, par-
ticularly in terms of value, alternately lead and lag like other classes.
The timing of the total quantity of U.S. exports (TEQ) and WIC
turns can now be understood in terms of that of the various classes.
At world import peaks, the strong tendency of crude materials export
quantity (CEQ) and food export quantity (FEQ) to lead, combined
with the mixed timing of MEQ, causes TEQ peaks to precede WIC
3Withtwo exceptions, all median leads or lags in EQ are longer than in the
corresponding 'EV series. The mean of the medians (disregarding signs)is one
quarter for EQ and 0.7 quarter for EV. In evaluating these intervals, it may be
recalled that the average duration of WIC was twenty quarters, fourteen of which
were expansions and six contractions.
This is due in part to governmental farm policies. See Section 9 of this chapter.
5Exceptthat semimanufactures behavelikefinished manufacturesat WIC
troughs, though not at peaks.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 121
peaks in the majority of instances before as well as after 1913. The
median lead is a little shorter in the later period, when MEQ has
greater weight, than in the earlier one.
The same holds for the timing of total export value at WIG, peaks,
except that in the early period two leads are replaced by coincidences.
This is due to slight differences between the value and the quantity
series, which caused the selection of later peaks in the former in
1903 and 1907.
The change in the commodity composition of exports between the
earlier and later period causes a significant change in the timing
of total export quantity and value (TEV) at WIG troughs. Before
1913, when FEQ has much weight and MEQ is not important, TEQ
tends to lag. After 1920, the irregular leads and lags of its com-
ponents result in TEQ troughs coinciding with WIG troughs in four
out of seven instances and also on the average.
C.DIFFERINGSECULAR TRENDS AS MAIN CAUSE OF
TIMING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLASSES
In evaluating the timing of exports at world cycle turns, attention
must be paid first to the nature of the data. U.S. exports, it must
be remembered, are being related to other countries' imports. Since
any given shipment is counted as an export before being counted as
an import, a bias toward leads is thus imparted to the timing com-
parisons—a bias which may vary over time and from class to class
according to the average duration of transportation. However, the
effect of this bias appears to be slight, at least when the measuring
units are as large as quarters. One' indication of the minor role of
shipping time is that the tremendous speeding up of transportation
has not led to a general shortening of export leads. The briefness
of leads and the frequency of coincidences point in the same direc-
tion, and the fact that turns in total export value coincide on the
average with WIG turns supports this view. This aspect of
the measures thus may be assumed to be of minor importance.
The explanation of the divergencies between export and WIG
turns and of variations in leads and lags by commodity classes lies
mainly in the differing long-run trends of the various series. Export
classes with rapid secular growth, like finished manufactures before
World War I and in the interwar period, turn down later and up
earlier than those which develop more slowly. Conversely, the falling
trend of food exports accounts for early peaks and late troughs,
particularly before 1913.122 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
Cyclical sequences may also be expected to account for timing
differences among commodity classes. One would expect turns in
raw materials to precede those in finished goods due to the greater
cycle sensitivity of the demand for the former. Actually, crude mate-
rials peaks do, on the whole, lead peaks in finished manufactures.
But the explanation does not fit at troughs where the rise in crude
materials tends to lag behind that in finished manufactures. Here
the trend effect evidently was stronger than the cyclical one. Crude
materials prices also do not lead finished manufactures prices, at WIC
troughs and hence crude materials export values (CEV) do not lead
MEV any more than CEQ lead MEQ.
d. CONCLUSION
In sum, then, one may expect all classes of U.S. exports to turn
at .about the same time as world imports, with fast-growing classes
beginning to rise somewhat earlier and to fall somewhat later and
with the declining classes showing the opposite behavior.
The findings throw some light on the view that, since the mid-
fifties, demand for American exports has become marginal. If this
view is taken to imply that U.S. exports rise later and fall earlier
than other countries' exports, it is not supported by the timing meas-
ures for the 1957 and 1959 WIG turns which fail to reveal a shift
toward earlier U.S. export peaks or later troughs. At the 1957 WIG
peak, total exports lead by one quarter as on many earlier occasions,
and finished manufactures even lag by two quarters, which is more
than the usual lag. The following trough of total and of finished
manufactures coincides with that in world imports, while the upturn
in semimanufactures even leads that of world imports by one year.
It is possible, of course, that the supposed relation prevailed between
U.S. exports and those of certain individual foreign countries, but
it is not to be found in the relation of turning points in U.S. exports
to those in total world trade. (The remarks on export turns of semi-
manufactures in 1960—61 in section 7 of this chapter suggest another
possible application of the marginal supplier theory.)
3. Domestic Business Cycles as Cause of Export Turns
Having established the role of turns in world demand as a cause of
reversals in U.S. exports, we can now attack our main problem: the
effects of DBC turns and export turns on one another.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 123
It is clear from the preceding findings, that the direct relations be-
tween exports and DBC turns must be obscured to some extent by
the impact of WIG turns. Assume, for instance, that an export peak
coincides with a peak in domestic business. Does this indicate a causal
relation between exports and domestic business? Does the downturn
in the former cause that in the latter? Or is the coincidence due
to a simultaneous downturn in world imports, so that the relation
between export and DBC turn is merely derived from the relation
to the WIG turn? Such questions must be answered if the timing
of export turns relative to the DBG is to be interpreted.
Before analyzing individual peaks and troughs from this point of
view, it is desirable to have a general., idea of the relative location
of world and domestic turns. The more closely they coincide, the
more easily will an export peak caused' by a WIG peak appear to
match a DBC peak, and correspondingly for troughs.
Tables 15—18 present the needed information. They show, for in-
stance, that from 1882 through 1902 not one out of thirteen U.S.
business peaks or troughs is within two quarters of those in the
WIG. From 1904 to 1913, however, there are four such close turns,
and in the period 1920—58 half of all DBC turns belong in this
class. This suggests that a large number of export turns will be close
to DBC turns because of their relation to WIG turns in the later
period, a, smaller number only in the earlier one.6 Good examples for
this type of situation are the peaks in 1907, 1937, and 1957, or the
trough of
Tables 15—18 also provide evidence for the view that correspond-
ence between turns in exports and like DBG turns is, in most cases,
due to the intervention of WIG turns. To see this, one must scan
the entries at those turns in the DBC which stand far apart from
6Thereare a few instances where an export and a DBC turn are associated
through a WIC turn despite a long interval between the latter and the DBC turn.
The most extreme cases of this type are represented by the troughs in MEQ and
SEQ (semimanufactures export quantities) in 1932, which are probably due to the
revival of world demand though the world trough occurs only ten quarters later.
Chart 17 shows that the enormous fall in world imports actually ends in the first
quarter of 1933. The slight further fall, which pushes the world trough out to
1935, is partly due to the weakness of prices and partly to delayed recovery of
food imports.
7Itmay be noted that, even when a WIC and a DBC turn coincide, an export
turn may match one without matching the other, as happens, for instance, in
the DBC and WIC troughs of 1908. The FEQ trough of 1910 can be regarded as
lagging behind the latter since world imports continued to expand until 1913.
But the same FEQ trough coincides with a DBC peak and can not, therefore, be
matched with the 1908 DBC trough.TABLE 15
Leads (-)andLags (+) of Peaks in U.S. Export Quantities (EQ)
at Peaks in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC)
and World Import Cycles (WJC), 1880-1913
Finished Crude
Manu- Mate-
Peaks inYear and QuarterTotalfactures rials Foods
Number of Quarters
DBC 1882 I n.r. n.r. n.r.
WIC 1883 II —1 0 —1 —1
DBC 1887 II —1 n.r. n.r. —1
DBC 1890 TIlE n.r. n.r. n.r. —2
WIC 1891 IV +1 +1 •—2 +1
DBC 1893 I n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
WIC 1894 I —2 n.r. +4 —2
DBC 1895 IV n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
DBC 1899 III n.r. +2 n.r. —5
WIC 1900 II +4 —1 —1 —8
DBC 1902 IV +1 n.r. +1 +1
WIC 1903 IV —3 n.r. —3 —3
DBC 1907 II —1 +1 —1 —6
WIC 1907 III —2 0 —2 —7
DBC 1910 I n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
DBC 1913 I +2 0 n.r. +1
WIG 1913 III 0 —2 +1 —1
Average lead or lag:
DBC median 0 +1.0 .0 —1.5
DBC mean +0.2 +1.0 0 —2.0
WIC median 1•.0 —0.3 —1.3 —2.0
WICmean —0.4 —0.4 —0.6 —3.0
Number of Turns
DBC peaks:
Related to EQ peaks. 4 3 2 6
Not related to EQ peaks 6 7 8 4
WIC peaks:
Relatedto EQ peaks 7 5 7 7
Not related to EQ peaks 0 2 0 0
EQ peaks:
Not related to DBC peaks 6 4 11 6
Not related to WIG peaks 2 1 5 4
n.r.not related.
Notes follow Table 24.TABLE 16
Leads (—)andLags (+) of Troughs in U.S. Export Quantities (EQ)







in Year and QuarterTotalfacturesrials Foods
Number of Quarters
WIC 1881 I +5 —3 +4 +5
DBC 1885 II +1 —3 0 n.r.
WIC 1886 I —2 —6 —3 —1
DBC 1888 I +2 n.r. n.r. +1
DBC 1891 II n.r. n.r. n.r. —1
WIC 18931 0 —2 0 0
DBC 1894 II +5 n.r. n.r. +5
WIC 1895 I +2 n.r. +2 +2
DBC 1897 II n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
DBC 1900 IV n.r. +1 +6 +5
WTC 1901 IV +2 —3 +2 +1
WIC 190411 0 n.r. 0 +1
DBC 1904 III —1 n.r. —1 0
WIC 1908 II +7 +2 —3 +7
DBC 1908 II n.r. +2 —3 n.r.
DBC 1911 IV n.r. n.r. n.r. +2
Average lead or lag:
DBC median +1.5 0 —0.5 +1.5
DBC mean +1.8 0 +0.5 +2.0
WIC median +1.3 —2.7 +0.7 +1.3
WIC mean +2.0 —2.4 +0.3 +2.1
Number of Turns
DBC troughs:
Related to EQ troughs 4 3 4 6
Not related to EQ troughs 5 6 5 3
WIC troughs:
Related to EQ troughs 7 5 7 7
Not related to EQ troughs 0 2 0 0
EQ troughs:
Not related to DBC troughs 5 3 8 5
Not related to WIC troughs 2 1 5 4
n.r. =notrelated.
Notes follow Table 24.TABLE 17
Leads (—)andLags (+) of Peaks in U.S. Export Quantities (EQ)
Peaks in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC) and
World Import Cycles (WIC), 1920-63
Finished Crude
Manu- Mate-
Peaks in Year and Quarter TotalfacturesfacturesrialsFoods
DBC 1960 II







Related to EQ peaks
Not related to EQ peaks
WIC peaks:
Related to EQ peaks
Not related to EQ peaks
EQ peaks:
Not related to DBC peaks
Not related to WIC peaks
n.r.not related.
















































































































































Leads (-)andLags (+) of Troughs in U.S. Export Quantities (EQ)
at Troughs in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC)






in Year and Quarter TotalfacturesfacturesrialsFoods
Number of Quarters
JDBC 1921 III +1 +2 —1 +4 n.r.
WIC 1921 IV 0 +1 —2 +3 n.r.
DBC 1924 III n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.n.r.
WIC 1926 II —3 n.r. —1 n.r. —2
DBC 1927 IV 0 n.r. n.r. 0 +2
DBC 1933 I —2 —2 —2 0 +2
WIC 1935 I —1 —10 —10 —1 +7
1938 II +2 +1 +1 +2 n.r.
WIC 1938 IV 0 —1 —1 0 n.r.
DBC 1945 IV 0 0 —1 —3 —3
DBC 1949 IV +1 +2 +2 n.r. +1
WIC 1950 I 0 +1 +1 n.r. 0
WIC 1953 I +4 —2 +1 0 +4
DBC 1954 III —2 —8 n.r. n.r. —2
DBC 1958 II +3 +3 —1 +3 —1
WIC 19591 0 0 —4 0 —4
DBC 1961 I n.r. n.r. +2 +4 n.r.
Average lead or lag:
DBC median +0.5 +1.0 —0.3 +1.7 0
DBC mean +0.4 —0.3 0 +1.4—0.2
WICmedian 0 —0.5 —1.3 0+0.7
WICmean 0 —1.8 —2.3 +0.4 +1.0
Numberof Turns
DBC troughs:
Related to EQ troughs 8 7 7 7. 6
Not related to EQ troughs2 3 3 3 4
WICtroughs:
Related to EQtroughs 7 6 7 5 5
Not related to EQ troughs0 1 0 2 2
EQ troughs:
Not related to DBC troughs3 0 4 6 4
Not related to WIC troughs2 0 2 6 4
n.r. =notrelated.
Notes follow Table 24.TABLE 19
Leads (-)andLags (+) of Peaks in U.S. Export Values (EV)




Peaks inYear and QuarterTotalfactures rials Foods
Number of Quarters
DBC 1882 I n.r. +5 n.r. n.r.
WIC 1883 II —1 0 —•1 —1
DBC 1887 II —4 n.r. n.r. —1
DBC 1890 III n.r. +1 n.r. —2
WIG 1891 IV 0 —4 —3 +1
DBC 1893 i n.r. n.r. n.r. —4
WIC 1894 I —2 n.r. —1 n.r.
DBC 1895 IV n.r. n.r. +3 n.r.
DBC 1899 III n.r. +2 n.r. —5
WIC 1900 II +4 +2 —8
DBC 1902 IV n.r. n.r. n.r. +1
WIC 1903 IV 0 n.r. n.r. —3
DBC 1907 II +3 +1 —1 0
WIC 1907 III +2 0 —2 —1
DBC 1910 I n.r. n.r. n.r. ñ.r.
DBC 19131 +2 +1 +3 +1
WIC 1913 III 0 —1 +1 —1
Averagelead or lag:
DBC median +0.3 +1.3 +1.7 —1.0
DBC mean +0.3 +2.0 +1.7 —1.4
WIC median 0 —0.7 —0.7 —1.0
WIC mean +0.4 —1.2 —0.7 —2.2
Number of Turns
DBC peaks:
Related to EV peaks 3 5 3 7
Not related to EV peaks 7 5 7 3
WIC peaks:
Related to EV peaks 7 5 6 6
Not related to EV peaks 0 2 1 1
EVpeaks:
Not related to DBC peaks 8 1 6 5
Not related to WIC peaks 3 0 2 5
n.r.not related.
Notes follow Table 24.TABLE 20
Leads (—)andLags (+) of Troughs in U.S. Export Values (EV)
at Troughs in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC) and
World Import Cycles (W1C), 188 0-1913
FinishedCrude
Troughs Menu- Mate-
in Year and QuarterTotalfactures rials Foods
Number of Quarters
WIC 1881 I +3 —3 +4 +5
DBC 1885 II +1 n.r. 0 n.r.
WIG 1886 I —2 +6 —3 —1
DBC 1888 I +2 —2 n.r. 0
DBC 1891 II n.r. +5 n.r. —2
WIC 1893 I 0 —2 0 n.r.
DBC 1894 II +3 n.r. +5 +3
WIC 1895 I 0 n.r. +2 0
DBC 1897 II n.r. •n.r. +1 n.r.
DBC 1900 IV n.r. +1 n.r. n.r.
WIC 1901 IV +1 —3 +2 +1
WIC 1904 II 0 n.r. n.r. +1
DBC 1904 III —i n.r. n.r. 0
WIG 1908 II +3 +2 +2 +7
DBC 1908 II +3 +2 +2 n.r.
DBC 1911 IV n.r. n.r. n.r. +2
Average lead or lag:
DBC median +2.0 +1.5 +1.5 +0.7
DBC mean +1.6 +1.5 +2.0 +0.6
WIC median +0.3 -1.0 +2.0 +1.0
WIC mean +0.7 0 +1.2 +2.2
Numberof Turns
DBC troughs:
Related to EV troughs 5 4 4 5
Not related to EV troughs 4 5 5 4
WIC troughs:
Related to EV troughs 7 5 6 6
Not related to EV troughs 0 2 1 1
EV troughs:
Not related to DBC troughs 5 0 4 6
Not related to WIG troughs 3 0 2 5
n.r.not related.
Notes follow Table 24.TABLE 21
Leads (-)andLags (+) of Peaks in U.S. Export Values (EV)
at Peaks in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC) and
World import Cycles (WIc,), 1920-63
. Finished Crude
Manu-Semimanu-Mate-
Peaks in Year and Quarter TotalfacturesfacturesrialsFoods
Number of Quarters
DBC 1920 I 0 +3 +1 0 n.r.
WIC 1920 II —1 +2 0 —1 +2
DBC 1923 II n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. —3.
WIC 1925 I 0 n.r. 0 0 —1
DBC 1926 III n.r. n.r. —6 0 n.r.
WIC 1929 II —1 —1 —1 —4 —1
DBC 1929 III —2 —2 —2 —5 —2
WIC 193711 +1 +1 0 0 +4
DBC 1937 II +1 +1 0 0 n.r.
WIC 1948 IV +1 —5 +1 —7 —5
DBC 1948 IV +1 —5 +1 —7 —5.
WIC 19521 0 —2 —2 —1 —3
DBC 1953 II —7 —7 —6 —8
WIC 195711 —i +2 —1 —1 —2
DBC 1957 III —2 +1 —2 —2 —3
DBC 1960 II n.r. n.r. +1 +2 n.r.
Average lead or lag:
DBC median —1.0 —0.5 —1.0 —1.0 3.7
DBC mean —1.2 —1.5 —1.8 —2.2—4.2
WIC median —0.3 0 —0.3 —1.0—1.3
WIC mean —0.1 —0.5 —0.4 —2.0—0.9
Number of Turns
DBC peaks:
Related to EV peaks 6 6 8 8 5
Not related to EV peaks 3 3 1 1 4
WIC peaks:
Related to EV peaks 7 6 7 7 7
Not related topeaks 0 1 0 0 0
EV peaks:
Not related to DBC peaks3 0 1 3 4
Not related to WIC peaks 1 0 1 5 3
n.r. =notrelated.
Notes follow Table 24.TABLE 22
Leads (-)andLags (+) of Troughs in U.S. Export Values. (E V)
at Troughs in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC) and






in Year and Quarter TotalfacturesfacturesrialsFoods
Number of Quarters
DBC 1921 III +1 +2 —1 +2 +1
WIC 1921 IV 0 +1 —2 +1 0
DBC 1924 III n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. —1
WIC 1926 II —1 n.r. —1 —1 —1
DBC 1927 IV 0 n.r. —7 0 +3
DBC 1933 I +7 +2 —2 0 +7
WIC 19351 —1 —6 —10 0 —1
DBC 1938 II +1 +1 +1 +2 n.r.
WIC 1938 IV 0 —1 —1 0 n.r.
DBC 1945 IV 0 0 —1 —3 —3
DBC 1949 IV +1 +2 +2 —6 +2
WIC 1950 I 0 +1 +1 —7 +1
WIC 1953! +4' —2 +1 0 +4
DBC 1954 III -2 -8 —5 —6 —2
DBC 1958 II +3 +3 —1 +4 —1
WIC 1959 I 0 0 —4 +1 —4
DBC 1961 I n.r. n.r. +8 n.r.
Average lead or lag:
DBC median +1.0 +1.7 —1.0 +0.7 0
DBC mean +1.5 +0.3 —0.7 —0.3+0.8
WIC median 0 —0.5 —1.3 0—0.5
WIC mean +0.3 —1.2 —2.3 —0.9—0.2
Number of Turns
DBC troughs:
Related to EV troughs 8 7 9 9 8
Not related to EV troughs2 3 1 1 2
WIC troughs:
Related to EV troughs 7 6 7 7 6
Not related to EV troughs0 1 0 0 1
EV troughs:
Not related to DBC troughs 2 0 1 3 2
Not related to WIC troughs 1 0 1
n.r. =notrelated.
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TABLE 23
Leads (-)andLags (+) of Peaks in U.S. Export Quantities (EQ)
and Values (EV) at Troughs in Domestic Business Cycles (DBC),
1880-1913









EQ EV EQ EV
Number of Quarters
1885 [I —9 n.r. —1 —1 n.r. n.r.
1888 I +6 +6 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
1891 II 0 —1 +3 +3 +3 +2
1894 II +3 —2 —3 n.r. —3 —3
1897 II +4 —3 +4 +4 +4 +4
1900 IV —3 0 n.r. +2 +2 +2
1904 III +3 +10 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
1908 II +4 n.r. n.r. n.r.nr. —1
1911 IV +1 n.r. —2 —2 n.r. n.r.
Average lead or lag:
Median +2.3 —0.5 0 +1.3 +2.5 +1.0
Mean +1.0 +1.7 +0.2 +1.2 +1.5 +1.3
Number of Turns
DBC troughs:
Related to EQ or
EVpeaks 9 6 5 5 4
Not related to EQ
orEVpeaks 0 3 4 4 5 4
EQ or EV peaks
Not related to
DBC troughs 2 3 5 7 4 6
n.r.not related.
Notes follow Table 24.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 133
TABLE 24
Leads (-)andLags (-i-)ofTroughs in U.S. Export Quantities (EQ)










EQ EV EQ EV EQ EV
Number of Quarters
1882! 0 0 +1 +1 +1 —1
1887 II —8 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
1890 III —1 —1 n.r. +1 —8 0
1893 I 0 0 0 n.r. 0 0
1895 IV —1 —1 —1 —3 —1 —3
1899 III —.1 —8 n.r. +2 —1 —4
1902 IV —2 —2 —3 —3 —2 n.r.
1907 II +1 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
1910! 0 —5 0 0 0 —4
1913 I 0 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
Average lead or lag:
Median —0.5 —1.3 —0.3 +0.5 —0.7 —2.0
Mean —1.2 —2.4 —0.6 —0.3 —1.6 —2.0
Number of Turns
DBC peaks:
Related to EQ or
EV troughs 10 7 5 6 7 6
Not related to EQ
or EV troughs 0 3 5 4 3 4
EQ orEY troughs
not related to
DBCpeaks 2 1 7 5 2 4
n.r. =notrelated.134 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
Notes to Tables 15-24
The dates of all turns are indicated in Appendix A and in Charts
2-15. Those of TEQ, SEQ, CEQ, and FEQ can also be found in Tables
25-38.
Turnsare matched by NBER staff,following mechanical rules.
Positivetimingis shownforallseries and periods, since all
series are positively related to WIC.
Inverse timing relative to the DBC is shown for the one series
which is classified as "inverse" by NBER rules, and for the two
partlyinverseseriesclassifiedas"irregular" by NBER rules.
Occasional inverse timing of series classified as "positive" is not
shown in these tables, but is shown in Tables 25-38, except for MEQ
which hardly ever turn at. unlike DBC turns.
In some instances, the number of export turns compared with DBC
turns exceeds the number compared with WIC turns, because some
quarters covered by exports and the DBC are not covered by the world
import series.
See notes to Table 14.
like WIG turns. None of the export quantity series, for instance,
has a peak matching the DBC peaks in 1910 and 1923 or a trough
in 1897 and 1924. Only in a very few cases does the table show a
positive relation between exports and the DBC which is not accounted
for by the WIC. It will be seen below that these few occurrences
are, indeed, cases where export turns cause turns in domestic business.
Where the relation between export and DBCturnsis not dominated
by the relation to WIG turns, we expect it to be an inverse one,
i.e., export peaks to be associated with DBC troughs and troughs with
peaks. Tables 23 and 24 show the extent to which this expectation
is justified in the cycles before 1913.8 A glance at the systematic cor-
respondence between DBG peaks and CEQ troughs should convince
the reader that these tables have a story to This impression
will be confirmed by the behavior of prices which will be included
in the analysis in the next section.
The relative importance of changes in foreign and domestic demand
varies greatly among commOdity classes, which therefore have to be
treated separately.
8Forthe period after 1921, inverse timing of exports at DBC turns has not been
tabulated in this fashion because of the small number of cases. Those instances
in which it does occur, however, are listed in Tables 25—38.
9Ina few instances, the occurrence of an export turn at an unlike DBC turn
may be due, in part, to a like WIC turn. This can happen when the WIC moves
inversely to the DBC. For example, in 1893 export troughs coincide with a WIC
trough and a simultaneous DBC peak.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 135
4. Failure of DBC Turns to Bring About MEQ Turns
With few exceptions, the peaks and troughs in the quantity and
value of finished manufactures (MEQ and MEV) can be ascribed
to like turns in world demand. That they are also from 1900 on
located, as a rule, near like DBC turns merely reflects the latter's
positive association with the WIG. This can be seen clearly from
the absence of like MEQ turns at all those DBC turns which are
far removed from WIG turns.10
The finding that turns in exports of finished manufactures are,
in general, caused by world demand implies that turns in domestic
business do not, as a rule, bring on opposite turns in this type of
exports. This is confirmed by the relations of quantity to price turns.
Manufactures export prices(MEP) conformed, on the whole, to
domestic business cycles, turning near like DBG turns. But these MEP
turns are, in most instances, not accompanied by opposite turns in
MEQ.'t
Thus, in the experience of the United States, declines in exports
of finished manufactures are not halted by the release of resources
which accompanies slowing domestic business, nor does a business
upturn put a stop to a rise in such exports. Moreover, DBG turns
not only fail to cause opposite MEQ turns but also fail to prevent
such turns from occurring at turns in world demand. A downturn
in world imports is associated with a downturn in MEQ, even if it
has been preceded by a domestic business downturn, which might
be expected to have a favorable effect on exports; and the same
is true, mutatis mutandis, of MEQ troughs at WIC troughs.
This finding disagrees, of course, with what traditional theory would
lead us to expect and should, therefore, be regarded with some sus-
picion. However, in the following chapter it will be shown that
measures of conformity and correlation also do not reveal an inverse
10Thereare no MEQ peaks in 1910, 1923, .1926, or 1960, and hence there are
no MEQ troughs at the corresponding DBC troughs in 1911, 1924, 1927, 1961
(Tables 15—19). On the 1933 trough, see footnote 6. Whether the 1945 trough is
due to the WIG is not known since world imports are available only from 1948.
11Aswill be shown in Chapter 7,thefull-cycle conformity index of MEP to
the DBC in 1921—61is+56; the Kendall rank correlation coefficient for MEP
and the clearings index is + .44.
For examples of the lack of association between MEQ and opposite MEP turns,
see Charts 3, 7,and.12, the MEP peaks in 1900, 1907, 1928, and 1957, and troughs
in 1905, 1925, and 1950.
The few instances where MEQ turns appear relatedto opposite' DBC turns
after 1900 (Chart 3) reflect the location of WIG turns near opposite DBC turns.136 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
relation between the DBC and MEQ. Several possible ways to account
for this will be explored there and the conclusion reached that the
domestic business cycle appears, indeed, to have no sizable, systematic
effect, one way or the other, on the quantity of finished manufactures
exports since the beginning of this century.
In the nineteenth century the behavior of MEQ was somewhat
different from later on and this is when the aforementioned excep-
tions to the rule that MEQ turns are not related to opposite DBC
turns occurred. An interesting contrast to the later pattern is repre-
sented by the events of 1879 and 1880 (not included in Tables 15—24
but in Chart 3). In the last quarter of 1879, exports reached a steep
peak at a low point in prices, and this was followed shortly by the
deepest export trough matching a high price peak. The reason for
this peculiar behavior was a unique event: the general price specula-
tion caused by the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Due to the
sudden surge of prices, many U.S. articles were excluded from foreign
markets. There followed a collapse in the spring of 1880 and by
summer most goods were again securing a market.12
None of the events of later years caused a reaction as strong as
this one, but there are a few other indications of an inverse relation
of MEQ, on the one hand, and MEP and DBC, on the other, before
1900. For instance, the halt in the secular decline of their prices in
1889 and its resumption in 1890 contributed to the peak and trough
in finished manufactures exports in those years.
One reason for the contrast between the earlier and later relation
of MEQ to the DBC is the declining share of cotton
Crude cotton exports, before World War I, were in very close inverse
relation to the DBC, as will be described in the next section. It is
plausible that export prices and quantities of the simple manu-
factured cotton goods of those years rose and fell together with crude
cotton. But there is also some direct evidence on this since Lipsey's
data make it possible to analyze a few subdivisions of manufactures
exports for the cycles 1879—1913. This analysis reveals that a number
of turns in the quantity of textile manufactures exports are, indeed,
associated with opposite turns in the DBC and with opposite turns
in the prices of these goods. The inverse relation is not as close as
for crude cotton exports, but it is clear enough. It contrasts sharply
with the relation to the DBC of turns in iron and steel exports,
i2 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 15 and September 25, 1880.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 137
another subdivision of finished manufactures exports which is more
representative of manufactures exports of later years than cotton.
Peaks and troughs in the quantity of iron and steel exports have not,
since the 1880's, been associated with opposite turns in either their
own prices or the
The insensitivity of the quantity of manufactures exports to U.S.
business cycles will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. Here
the factors that could account for it and for the corresponding im-
perfect conformity and small amplitude of manufactures prices will
be noted only briefly. One of these is the high degree of differentia-
tion of many goods in this class. This prevents fluctuations in do-
mestic demand from affecting production for export during the short
periods involved here. High supply elasticity of many manufactured
goods is a second factor. Small price changes suffice in these cases
to accommodate changes in domestic demand. Thirdly, it is plausible
that the reaction of foreign demand for manufactured goods to such
small price changes is weak in the short run. Together, these factors
could explain the mild reaction of MEP and the lack of reaction
of MEQ to the DBC.
5. Peaks and Troughs in Domestic Business Matched by
Opposite Turns in Crude Materials Exports, 1879—1913
The class of exports most closely related to swings in domestic busi-
ness is crude materials, and the explanation of their turns requires,
therefore, more extensive discussion than finished manufactures.
The outstanding fact is that turns in crude materials exports (CEQ)
from 1879 to 1913 are clearly associated with opposite turns in do-
mestic business cycles and with like turns in world import cycles.
Since DBC turns sometimes match like and sometimes match unlike
WIC turns, the fact that CEQ is inversely related to the one and
positively to the other results in what at first appears to be a con-
fusing picture. However, closer inspection shows the timing of CEQ
turns to be quite regular with respect to domestic as well as foreign
cycles.
13Dataon subdivisions of the major classes are not available for quantities and
prices except for the period covered by Lipsey,i.e.,1879—1923. (See Robert E.
Lipsey, Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States,
Princetonfor NBER, 1963.) The analysisofsubdivisionsoffinished manu-
factures for this period will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.138 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
Consider, first, what happens to crude materials exports at the ten
peaks in the DBC. Table 24 and Chart 4 reveal the striking regularity
with which a deep CEQ trough matches these peaks. At nine out
of the ten occasions, there is half a year or less between the two
opposite turns. In that period, then, a downturn in domestic demand
almost unfailingly brought an improvement in the quantity of crude
materials exports and often also in their value. This effect was not
only certain and sudden but surprisingly fast. At four domestic peaks
there is a coincident CEQ trough; at four others the CEQ trough
even slightly precedes the business peak.
How is the association between CEQ troughs and DBC peaks to
be reconciled with the earlier finding on the former's association with
WIG troughs which mostly do not coincide with DB•C peaks? The
answer is that a downturn in the domestic economy as well as an
upturn abroad causes an upturn in exports of crude materials. Con-
versely, with a single exception in 1906, no CEQ trough occurs that
is not related to either a DBC peak or a WIG trough.
Tables 25—38 present a summary view of this complex situation.
They show for each turn in export quantity the related like turns
in world imports, like and unlike turns in domestic business, and
like and unlike turns in corresponding export prices. (These entries
are explained in the notes to the tables.)
The evidence provided by the associate4 turns in columns 2—6 of
the table, and other information where necessary, is then condensed
into a classification of each turn shown in column 1. The purpose
of this classification is, it should be stressed, to give the reader at a
glance an idea of the typical main causes of export turns for a given
commodity class and time period. Labeling a turn as due, say, to
the WIG is not meant to rule out contributions by other factors.
Also, there are borderline cases where the classification is debatable.
But what matters here is not an individual case but the over-all
picture, and this would not be changed by moving one turn or an-
other from one category into another.
The classification of the l53 export quantity turns covered is, with
a few exceptions, based on the following rules:
1. If an export turn is related to unlike turns in both domestic
business and prices(fifty-two instances), itis attributed to the in-
verse effect of the DBC.
2. If an export turn does not satisfy rule 1 but is related to a likeWhen and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 139
turn in the WIC (sixty instances), the latter is regarded as the main
cause of the export turn.
3. If an export turn is related to an unlike DBC turn, but not
to an unlike price turn nor to a like WIG turn (fifteen instances),
it is attributed either to the inverse effect of the DBC or to both
this effect and the effect of the WIG.
4. If an export turn is not related either to a like WIC turn or
to an unlike DBC turn (twenty-six instances), it is classified as due
to causes other than the DBC and WIG. In cases where I hold turns
in crop cycles or government intervention as mainly responsible, the
turn is marked accordingly. This group also includes those rare in-
stances where export turns do not match WIG turns but do match
like DBC and price turns and where exports were regarded as the
cause of a business reversal (four food turns, 1879—1913).
Let us now see what Table 26 reveals about CEQ troughs in 1879—
19 13. The most outstanding feature is the frequency with which DBC
peaks and also peaks in crude materials export price (CEP) coin-
cide, or roughly coincide, with CEQ troughs (columns 5 and 6).
The corresponding spaces in columns 3 and 4 are empty. This signifies
that the subsiding pressure of domestic demand appears to be mainly
responsible for CEQ troughs. Accordingly, eight of the twelve entries
in column 1 designate the DBC as the main factor.
That the upturn in CEQ was not due to an upturn in world
demand is shown by the absence of WIC troughs at five of these
eight CEQ troughs (column 2). At the remaining three, the simul-
taneous downturn of crude materials prices argues against foreign
demand as the determining force. This leaves three CEQ troughs
which appear to be due primarily to WIC troughs.14
The inverse impact of the DBC on crude materials exports, which
stands out so clearly at quantity troughs, is blurred at value troughs,
as would be expected. Since the relevant changes in CEQ are typically
accompanied by price changes in the opposite direction, the move-
ments of CEV tend to be milder than those of CEQ. Rising prices
reduce or prevent a fall in value when quantity is on the downgrade,
14 Since CEQ in this period consisted largely of cotton, it should be mentioned
that the inverse relation between cotton exports and cotton prices in the framework
of U.S. business cycles was noted by Frederick C. Mills, in "Elasticity of Physical
Quantities and Flexibility of Unit Prices in the Dimension of Time," Journal of
the American Statistical Association, December 1946, p. 450.
See also the note on cotton exports in Wesley C. Mitchell, What Happens during
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Notes to Table 25
aFactors selected as mainly responsible for timing of export turns:
WP worldimportcyclepeak: WTworld import cycle trough;
DPdomestic business cycle peak; IDT= domesticbusiness cycle
trough; CTcrop cycle trough.
General Note: Except for column 1, most entries are based on the
same standard NBER rules which underlie Tables 15-24; columns 2,
3, and 5 show the same relationships as in those tables. There are
some discrepancies, however, due to certain amendments to the rules
requiredbythepeculiarproblemencounteredinexpàrt turns.
The main difference arises because some turns in an export series
may be related to like and others to unlike DBC turns here, whereas
standard NBER analysis either treats all turns in a series as posi-
tively or all as inversely related to the DBC. We admit both relation-
shipsforanexport series,but notfor individual export quantity
turns, which we relate only to either a like or an unlike DBC turn.
This means that in the case of 26 EQ turns, out of the 153 turns
covered, a choice has to be made between two related DBC turns.
The main rules determining this choice are:(1) If the EQ turn is
related to an unlike price turn, it is related to the unlike DBC turn.
(2) If the EQ turn is not related to an unlike price turn, but is related
to a like WIC turn, it is related to the like DBC turn. (3) If the EQ
turn, is not related either to an unlike price turn or to a like WIC turn,
it is related to whichever of the two DBC turns is closer.
As to price turns, they may again be related to either like or unlike
EQ turns. In the great majority of instances this presents no problem
since, by standard rules, most price turns match only a similar or
a different quantity turn,not both. But when a decision is required, the
rule is to select the closer turn. Matched price-quantity turns are rare-
ly more than two quarters apart.
Several further discrepancies between this table and Tables 15-24
arise from minor changes in rules which involve, for instance, the ex-
clusion here of some relationships involving long leads of EQ turns to
turns in other series. Also this table covers a somewhat longer period
than Tables 15-24.
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Schematic Relations Among Turning Points in Domestic
Business Cycles, World Import Cycles, and Crude Export
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falling prices offset part of the quantity growth after the trough.
The number and amplitude of value cycles is thus reduced and the
turns shifted in the direction of like DBG turns. Hence, compared
with twelve quantity troughs, there are only eight GEV troughs.15
Moreover, the number attributable to domestic business peaks is
reduced to four, while three others are again explained by world
troughs.
Just as downturns in domestic demand cause upturns in GEQ, so
upturns in demand bring peaks in exports (Table 25). The differ-
ence is only that the latter effect is slower than the former so that
GEQ peaks lag about a year behind business troughs. This asymmetry
between upper and lower turning points seems plausible enough.
One would expect a rise in domestic absorption to encroach only
gradually on exports. When, on the other hand, home demand begins
to fall, there are immediately excess supplies which are eagerly sought
abroad because of the preceding tightness.
Once it is recognized that GEQ peaks are associated with domestic
expansion as well as with WIG peaks, their occurrence is seen to
be quite systematic. There is no peak in WIG without an associated
peak in GEQ, and there is no domestic expansion with rising CEQ
• without a GEQ peak occurring about midway. In other words, an
upswing of GEQ was checked unfailingly by a downturn in world
demand as well as by domestic expansion frits later stages. All the
thirteen peaks in GEQ are accounted for by one or both of these
factors: five by WIG peaks, seven by DBG troughs, and one by both
(Table 25).
Value peaks differ from those in quantity for the same reason and
in the same fashion as the corresponding troughs. Quantity peaks
which are due to upturns in prices in connection with rising domestic
demand are rarely reflected in value peaks. When, however, a peak
in world demand is the cause of the quantity peak, value usually
begins to fall at about the same time.
The WIG peaks are in 1883, 1900, 1903, 1907, 1913; the DBG troughs
in1881, 1889, 1895, 1898, 1905, 1909, 1912; the peak in 1891 is due to
both factors.
Onemaybe puzzled about how the occurrence of GEQ peaks in the
midst of domestic expansion and also at WIG peaks is compatible with
15 Export valuç turns are shown in Tables 19—22 and are interpreted in the
same way as quantity turns.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 145
the timing of peaks in world and domestic cycles relative to each. other.
The answer is that, prior to 1913, DBC peaks used to precede WIC
peaks by several quarters. Thus it was possible for CEQ to turn down-
ward some -timebefore the DBC peak, next upward again as soon as
this peak was reached, and downward a second time a year or so later
when world imports began to fall. This can be seen clearly on Chart 4.
For instance, one CEQ peak in 1912 -coincides roughly with a DBC
trough, while the next CEQ peak in. 1913 is related to the 1913 WIC
peak. Shortly before this WIC peak, there was a DBC peak which co-
incided with a CEQ trough. Thus it is possible for an export turn to
be associated with opposite turns in U.S. and like turns in foreign
cycles despite a positive relation between U.S. and foreign cycles.
The different explanation of the two types of CEQ peaks is supported
by the behavior of prices. Those CEQ peaks which are brought on by
domestic expansion are all matched by CEP troughs; those caused by
receding world demand are not.'6
6. Effect of COtton Crop on Turns in .Crude
Materials Exports, 1879—1913
The argument so far has been that turns in crude material exports
in 1879—1913 can be explained by turns in foreign and domestic
demand. But what about the role of supply? In the period under
review, from 45 to 70 per cent of CEQ consisted of raw cotton
exports. Since the large cyclical swings of these exports are known
to be closely related to the varying size of the cotton crop,'7 it seems
probable that turns in CEQ also are determined to a considerable
extent by turns in cotton crops. If thisiscorrect, does itconflict
with the interpretation that these same turns are due to changes
in foreign and domestic demand?
To answer these questions, it must be ascertained, first, whether
CEQ turns actually match turns in cotton exports and, if so, whether
18 See Chart 19.
17 The positivecorrelationbetween annual cottonexports and thecotton
crop is mentioned, for instance, in M. Abramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles,
p.194. correlation between the directions of change inthe crop and
exports, 1866—1942, is + .60. Apparently when the United States cropislarge,
the price of cotton tends to be depressed and more American cotton tends to be
sold abroad for consumption and stockpiling...
R.Engberg in Industrial Prosperity and the Farmer, p. 175, mentions a coeffi-
cient of + .96 for the correlation of the volume of cotton exports and the size
of the crop, 1881—1913.146 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
they also correspond to turns in the cotton crop.'8 On the first point,
I find that, with a single exception, every peak and trough in cotton
exports has its counterpart in CEQ, but not all CEQ turns can be
traced to cotton exports. In twelve instances turns in the two series
coincide, in four others they are four to six months apart, while
another nine CEQ turns do not match any cotton export turn. In
some of these latter cases, however, slight differences between the
two series or between their seasonal adjustments may be responsible
for the discrepancy.
At any rate, the relation between CEQ turns and cotton export
turns is close enough to suggest the possibility that variations in the
cotton crop may be a major factor determining CEQ turns. Systematic
comparison confirms this. There is, indeed, a high degree of similarity
between turns in CEQ and turns in the cotton crop.19
To compare export turns with crop turns, the usual timing meas-
ures require slight modification. The cotton crop is, of course, meas-
ured annually, and it makes little sense to speak of leads and lags
of quarterly exports in relation to this annual total. Therefore, it
will merely be noted whether an export turn occurs during a year
of like turn in the crop or not. The crop year matched with exports
extends from the third quarter of the calendar year, when the cotton
harvest begins, through the second quarter of the following calendar
year. Thus an export trough in the first quarter of a calendar year
is not regarded as matching a short crop in the fall of that same
calendar year. This is not to deny that the crop of one year may
affect exports in the preceding and succeeding ones, as it certainly
does. But it serves to separate immediate and direct impacts from
others. This is particularly necessary because over a considerable part
of the period short and large cotton crops alternated, so that any
quarter was close to both a crop peak and a crop trough. Thus a
sharp distinction must be made between exports during one crop
year and another in order to obtain a meaningful result.
Ten out of the twelve CEQ troughs occur in trough crop years,
and seven out of eleven CEQ peaks in peak crop years. Conversely,
there are only one trough and three peak years in cotton crops in
18 The comparison is with a monthly series of cotton exports in million pounds
from Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Turns in this series were set by the National Bureau. The center month of the
quarterly CEQ turn is here compared to the monthly turn in cotton exports.
19 The cotton crop series is from Cotton Crop of the U.S., 1790—1911, Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Circular 32, 1912 (for 1:879—98); and Agricultural Statistics,
1942 (for 1899—1913). Turns in this series were set by the National Bureau.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 147
which CEQ did not reach a low or high point. There is thus no
doubt about the fact that CEQ turns are closely linked to turns
in the cotton crop.
Hence both supply and demand worked in the same direction,
and itis likely that both contributed to causing crude materials
exports to reverse their direction. Thus export peaks are due either
to the combined effect -of a peak cotton crop and peak foreign de-
mand or to that of a peak crop and a trough in domestic demand,
and export troughs can be similarly explained.20
Some may object that supply alone may be responsible for CEQ
turns and that their close association with reversals in demand is
merely due :to the coincidence of demand -turnsand cotton crop
turns. In addition to the implausibility of this interpretation, some
pieces of evidence against it may be cited. The most important one
is the tithing-ofturns of crude material exports excluding cotton.
Though only the value, not the quantity, of this series has been
analyzed, the correspondence of the turns to like turns in the WIG
and unlike ones in the DBC appears quite clearly. All turns in the
series match turns in one or both reference chronologies.
Another, aspect of the findings which suggests the influence of. de-
mand is thai those 'CEQ turns which do not take place at cotton
crop turns are still, as a rule, related to inverse turns in the DBC.
Thus the two CEQ troughs which are not located in cotton crop
trough years still coincide with DBC peaks, and three out of the
four CEQ peaks which are not at cotton crop peaks are related to
DBC troughs. On the other hand, there is only a single CEQ turn,
the trough in 1906, which coincides only with a crop turn and not
also with a turn in demand.
20Thisimplies, of course, that cotton crop turns occur a number of times near
like turns in world demand and even, more frequently near unlike turns in the
DBC. This inverse relationship between cotton output and business activity has
been clearly esiablished by Geoffrey Moore and is,in his words, "an unsolved
puzzle"(Harvest Cycles,"unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, Harvard University,
1947, p. IV-49).' Moore finds that this is hardly due to chance since cotton output
does not vary merely with the weather, but is subject to considerable cOntrol by
growers. Sign correlations between acreage and output and between yield and
output are +.65 and +.71, respectively (ibid., pp. 11-42 through 11.45).
Other investigators have, analyzed the variations in the cotton crop and have
found them determined by such factors as absolute or relative' movements
in cotton prices or by the grower's ability to finance the crop. (See, e.g., R. C.
Engberg, Induslrial Prosperity and the Farmer, New York, 1927, Chap. VII.) But
whether these forces account for the inverse relation of the crop to business
cycles in 1888—1914 or whether this relation was due to chance has not been shown,
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The varying location of CEQ turns within crop years is another
indication of the contribution of domestic consumption. When, for
instance, a business expansion continues into the crop trough year,
as in 1881/82 or in 1892/93, CEQ shOws improvement only in the
second quarter of the calendar year following the small crop, simul-
taneously with the first decline in domestic demand. When, how-
ever, the DBC contraction starts just before the small crop is har-
vested, exports are on the upgrade immediately, so that the third
quarter of the crop trough year is their lowest point.
It seems reasonable to conclude that CEQ turns in 1879—1913 are,
in general, due to the combined effect of like turns in the cotton
crop and either like turns in foreign or unlike turns in domestic
demand.2'
7. Diminishing Impact of Turns in DBC on Those in
Exports of Crude Materials and Semimanufactures
After World War I
Measures of conformity and amplitude in Chapter 6 will reveal the
sharp shift after World War I in the behavior of CEQ during do-
mestic business cycles. The highly regular inverse relation of the
earlier period gives way to a fairly regular positive one. Tables
27 and 28 show that evidence of this shift is also found in the turning
points of CEQ,butit is less sharp and less sudden than the con-
formity measures would suggest. Half of the CEQ turns in the inter-
war period (eight Out of sixteen) still match unlike DBC turns and
this also holds for the 1940's and 1960. However, the four CEQ
turns of the 1950's are all due to reversals in world demand and
not attributed to the inverse DBC effect. The weaker impact of the
latter after World War Iis reflected in the smaller proportion of
corresponding turns and in the greater uncertainty surrounding some
matching decisions. Nevertheless, the timing comparisons disclose that
the inverse influence of the DBC on CEQ was still present in the
later period as well.
Among the factors which have prevented reversals in domestic busi-
ness from causing opposite turns in CEQ, the following seem to be
21.Thepercentage of the cotton crop which is exported also turns at about the
same time as CEQ.Thismay be due to the shift in demand; but it can also result
from the- supply side, namely, when world demand is more elastic than the
domestic one, which is not unlikely. In this case a change in supply will, other
things being equal, result in a similar change in the share of exports.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 149
the most important: the greater synchronization of world and do-
mestic business cycles; the reduced influence and changed behavior
of cotton exports; and the great upheavals of this period, such as
the Korean War and the Suez crisis.
As for the first factor,it has been shown above that turns in
WIC are closer to turns in DBC in the later than they are in the
earlier period. Hence it could happen more frequently than before
that a simultaneous turn in WIG offsets the effect of a DBC turn,
with the result that CEQ either do not turn at all or turn the same
way as the WIG. For instance, the downturn in world demand pre-
vented an upturn of CEQ at the 1929 DBC peak. On two other
occasions, in 1920 and 1957, WIG peaks even brought peaks in CEQ
nearly coincident DBC peaks. Similarly, WIG troughs in 1938
and 1959 contributed to like turns in CEQ.
The role of cotton exports has changed in many ways, and this
is perhaps the most important reason for the shift in the timing of
CEQ turns. First, the share of crude cotton in crude materials exports
fell gradually from about 60 per cent in the earlier period to 20
per cent in 195 1—60. Hence it is not surprising that turns in CEQ
do not match turns in cotton exports, as a rule, after 1920. Moreover,
even cotton export turns themselves are only loosely linked to the
cotton crop in an era of surplus stocks and government disposal
programs. So even if turns in the cotton crop had occurred as fre-
quently near opposite DBC turns after 1920 as before World War I,
they would not have contributed much to an inverse relation between
CEQ and DBC turns due to their small influence on the former.
But not only did cotton production play a smaller role,it also
played a different one. Insofar as crop turns did affect CEQ turns,
they pulled toward like rather than unlike turns in domestic busi-
ness. The main such instances are the CEQ peak and trough in 1927,
caused largely by a peak cotton crop in 1926 and a trough crop
in 1927, and matching like turns in the DBC. The rise and fall in
output here greatly exceeded, in its effect on exports, the counter-
vailing force of the mild domestic cycle. Conversely, the coincidence
of a small crop with high domestic demand, frequent before 1913,
is rare thereafter. Thus, a crop trough could not often have con-
tributed to a downturn in CEQ even if the link between crop and
CEQ turns had been as strong as before.
This changed role of supply was reinforced occasionally by pro-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.152 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
recovery of cotton exports—and thus of CEQ—in 1959 was aided by
the lowering of support prices.22
Finally, in a few instances, the great international disturbances of
the era after World War I prevented the occurrence of CEQ troughs
in the neighborhood of DBC peaks. Three of these events occurred
in the midst of U.S. expansions. (This may not be entirely due to
chance, i.e., the expansions may have been prolonged by these events.)
In 1926 the British coal strike caused a large rise in• coal exports
which, together with the peak cotton crop mentioned above, pre-
vented a small dip in CEQ from developing into a trough at the
1926 business peak. More recently, the Korean War and the Suez
crisis prevented CEQ from turning down after the DBC troughs of
1949 and 1954.
The impact of fluctuations in domestic demand was offset at times
by the factors mentioned. It was not eliminated, however, as can
be seen not only from the remaining instances of inverse turns but
also from the behavior of crude materials exports prices. Throughout
the 1920's the movements of CEP mirror those of CEQ. Four of
our turns in CEQ coincide with opposite turns in CEP during that
period; and a glance at Chart 9 shows a considerable number of
additional matching turns terminating subcyclical movements, such
as CEQ peaks and CEP troughs in the second quarter of 1922 and
in the first quarter of 1925, or CEP peaks and CEQ troughs in
the first quarters of 1923 and 1924. After the precipitous price fall
of the early 1930's, the inverse relation reappears in 1933, prevails
through 1938, and again from the 1946 to the 1951 CEQ peaks.
During the remainder of the 1950's there is but little change in
prices, and what there is does not appear to be inverse to CEQ. In
1960, however, an upturn in prices again precedes a downturn in
quantity.
Value turns in exports of crude materials differ from quantity
turns in the same fashion in the later period as before World War
I. They again match more often like and less often unlike DBC
turns than is true of turns in quantity. When the quantity exported
rises to a peak in connection with falling prices before a DBC trough,
value sometimes fails to grow so that there is no inverse CEV peak
to correspond to the CEQ peak. This occurs, for instance, in 1921
and 1938. Similarly, there are no CEV troughs matching the CEQ
22 International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton,"MonthlyReview of the
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troughs at the DBC peaks in 1920 and 1923 because of the related
rise and fall of prices.
Export turns close to like turns in the DBC, on the other hand,
which are often due to turns in foreign demand and are thus not
related, to opposite turns in prices, sometimes appear only in value
and not in quantity, like the CEV peak in 1937.
This explains the results shown in Tables 17, 18, 21, and 22, namely,
that from 1920 to 1963, seventeen out of twenty-three turns in CEV
match like DBC turns while only thirteen Out of twenty-five CEQ
turns are so related.
The timing of turns in the quantity of semimanufactures exports
is intermediate between that of finished manufactures and that of
crude materials (Tables 29 and 30). As might be expected, reversals
in this class of exports are associated more closely with opposite turns
in d9mestic demand and less closely with turns in world demand
than is true of reversals in exports•f finished manufactures. Con-
versely, the influence of the DBC is smaller and that of the WIC
larger than for crude materials.
In four instances, a SEQ turn is associated with a like WIC turn,
while CEQ at the same time experiences only a minor turn or none
at all. This happens in 1921, 1937, and again in 1949 and 1950.
On the other hand, five CEQ turns located at opposite turns in the
DBC have no counterpart in SEQ (1920, 1933, 1936, 1938, 1960).
That turns in semimanufactures are more often due to world de-
mand and less often to domestic demand and supply than CEQ
turns is als6 shown by the' behavior of semimanufactures prices. Most
turns in SEP match like SEQ turns. Only in the 1920's is the relation
an inverse one and again briefly in 1948; since the trough of 1950,
six turns in price have matched like quantity turns.
Value of semimanufactures usually turns at the same time as quan-
tity. The few divergencies again cause SEV to conform better to the
WIC and less well to the inverse DBC in most instances than SEQ
does, except in 1.23
To summarize, the tendency of peaks and troughs in domestic.
business to cause troughs and peaks in crude materials and semi-
manufactures exports was weaker after World War I than earlier.
It had been reinforced in 1879—1913 by the frequent coincidence of
large cotton crops with business cycle troughs and small crops with
23Thereis a quantity but no value peak at the DBC trough of 1921. The 1929
peak in value is due to the WIC peak, while the 1928 peak in quantity can be













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.156 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
business peaks. The more nearly positive relation of crop cycles to
business cycles, the dwindling role of the cotton crop, the greater
parallelism of world and U.S. business cycles, and the great interna-
tional crises of the latter years all counteracted, to some extent, the
influence of variations in domestic demand. Nevertheless, in the inter-
war period and through the 1940's, about one in every two turns
in these export classes is associated with an opposite turn in the DBC.
It is only since 1950 that the inverse DBC effect seems temporarily or
permanently, to be quite weak.
NOTE ON SEMIMANUFACTURES EXPORT TURNS IN 1960—61
The latest turning points in the quantity of semimanufactures ex-
ports in 1960—61 are interesting because they differ from their pre-
decéssors. They are the only such turns covered that are neither asso-
ciated with a like WIG turn nor with an unlike DBG turn except
for the SEQ trough in 1932. We are faced with the puzzling question
of why exports of semimanufactures should have turned downward
at a time of rising world imports and domestic recession, while dur-
ing some thirty years (192.2—38 and 1948—60) WIG expansions had
never been associated with falling SEQ.
Some readers may be inclined to look for special factors affecting
one or a few commodities for an explanation. However, the evi-
dence does not support this view. In general, factors affecting indi-
vidual commodities, other than wheat and cotton in the early days,
have not been found to account for any turns in major export classes.
In particular, none of the "special" events of 1960 seems to provide
the explanation. This includes the turn in copper exports, which was
apparently the strongest such case. Fear of political upheavals in
producing areas led to an unusually large stockpiling of copper in
1959—60, which contributed to the subsequent sharp fall in copper
exports. However, copper stockpiling occurred during a general spurt
in inventory investment, so that part played by special forces is
questionable. Secondly, the fall in copper exports accounts for only
a minor part of the SEQ decline.
The inverse effect of the DBC can also not account for the SEQ
peak since the latter occurred one quarter after the U.S. business
cycle peak and most of the SEQ decline took place during the U.S.
recession. The associated fall in SEP would also preclude such an
interpretation.
By way of contrast, the peak in exports of crude materials which
came shortly after the peak in semimanufactures exports may be dueWhen and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 157
to an inverse DBCeffect.In this case a considerable part of the CEQ
decline occurred during the U.S. business expansion and was accom-
panied by rising prices of crude materials. It is because the CEQ peak
does not seem to present the same kind of problem as the SEQ peak
that we are concerned here with the latter only.
Despite the rise in total world imports, therefore, one must look
to foreign demand for an explanation of the decline in semimanu-
factures exports. This means there must have been a change in the
relation of world imports of semimanufactures to either (1) total world
imports or (2) U.S. exports of semimanufactures, or a change in both
of these relations.
As far as we can judge from available world data, the first possibility,
namely that world imports of materials fell while total world imports
rose, must be rejected.24 The former did not decline in 1960—fl, but
merely grew more slowly than other commodity classes (finished
manufactures and foods).
There remains then the second possibility that a mere slowdown
in world imports sufficed—contrary to earlier times—to cause a down-
turninU.S.exportsofsemimanufactures.Thisinterpretati.on
is interesting because it seems to accord with the view, advanced
by experts in thelate1950's and early1960's,that the United
States has become a marginal source of supply for certain types
of export goods. Shipments of such goods from theU.S.,itis
held, tend to increase sharply in the later stages of a foreign boom
when foreign supply becomes insufficient. When these pressures abate,
U.S. exports become expendable and decline. The great reserve ca-
pacity in the United States is said to account for the marginal supplier
role.
This view is mentioned in a number of articles on fluctuations in
U.S. nonagricultural exports 'by Department of Commerce econo-
mists. It is supported especially in an investigation by Francis G.
Masson and John B. Boddie, showing
that since 1956 U.S. exports to the industrialized countries ceased to expand
when industrial production in these countries increased by less than about
7 per cent annually... Theemergence of this relation in 1955—56 marks
the close of the postwar era—the point at which productive capacity abroad
was adequate to supply domestic and foreign requirements for goods except
during periods of very intense demand pressure. Also, the great reserve
capacity' of industry in the United States and slow growth in domestic U.S.
24Sinceworld data are not classified in the same way as U.S. exports, the only
feasible comparison is to world imports of industrial materials.158 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
demand made itpossible for foreign demand to be reflected rapidly in
expanded exports to foreign countries.25
It is plausible that the relation of U.S. exports to foreign imports
is similar to their relation to foreign production referred to by Masson
and Boddie. This would mean that the new type of SEQ peak in
1960 could be explained by the new role of the United States as mar-
ginal supplier.
There is, however, one major difficulty with this explanation: Dur-
ing the 1960—61 SEQ and CEQ declines, foreign industrial growth was
not slow but unusually rapid and the Masson and Boddie equation
explains not a fall but a steep rise in U.S. nonagricultural exports
to industrialized countries, a rise that was due to finished manu-
factures (capital goods) exports.26 To fit the facts the marginal sup-
plier hypothesis thus must be taken to mean that rapid growth in
foreign industrial output causes, at first, a large rise in U.S. exports
of semimanufactures and crude materials. But this rise stops and
reverses itself as soon as inventories have been built up, whereas
exports of finished manufactures continue their advance as long as
foreign output maintains its growth. In their case supply is less elastic
and order backlogs may have to be worked
Since this hypothesis fits to date only the downturns of semimanu-
factures and crude materials exports in 1960, it cannot be told whether
we are faced with a unique occurrence or with a new pattern. It
should be noted at any rate, however, that the marginal supplier
hypothesis is more complicated than appears at first glance and that
it requires specific assumptions about differences among foreign and
domestic demand and supply elasticities and price rigidities.
8. Relation Between Food Export Turns and Domestic
Business Cycle Turns, 1879—1913
Food consumption does not vary as much during business cycles as
the demand for raw materials does. Hence one would not expect
25 Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, February 1963, p. 23.
For other articles see various issues of 1958, 1961, 1962.
26 It should be noted that the total value of U.S. exports continued to rise in
1960—61 just as the total value of world imports did.
27 The Survey of Current Business, December 1961, p.18, comments that the
"European slowdown mainly affects our exports of industrial materials. In invest-
ment goods the backlog isstill large enough to permit production to continue
on a rising trend." It should be noted that the SEQ peak was not followed by a
MEQ peak.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 159
food exports to be inhibited by business expansion or promoted by
contraction to the same extent as exports of crude materials are.
Also, crop growing conditions in the United States and abroad cause
sharp fluctuations in these exports, which consist mainly of grains.
Turns in food exports, therefore, are likely to be largely supply de-
termined and not closely associated with opposite turns in domestic
business activity.
It is not surprising, then, that Tables 23 and 24 show no unlike FEQ
turn at several of the DBC turns which are matched by CEQ turns.
No FEQ troughs are registered at the DBC peaks in1890,1899,
1907, and 1913, at all of which CEQ did turn up. Nor do we find
FEQ peaks after the DBC troughs in 1888, 1904, and 1908 corres-
ponding to the CEQ peaks linked to these dates.
What is noteworthy, however, is the rather unexpected fact that
quite a number of reversals in food exports areassociatedwith oppo-
site turns in domestic business. In some of these instances, a downturn
in foreign demand reinforced the effect of a domestic upturn, or a
foreign trough that of a domestic peak. Also in a few instances, a
harvest peak occurred near a DBC trough so that falling supply con-
tributed to the downturn in exports. But not all cases are to be
explained in this way. There is, for example, an export trough at
the DBC peak of 1910 which is not associated with a WIC trough
and which, moreover, occurs during a peak crop year. My conclusion
that it was, in this case, the rising home demand which curtailed
exports agrees well with comments made at the time: "This falling
off in the exportation of foodstuffs is apparently due, in a large
part at least, to increased consumption at home, rather than to a de-
cline in production." The same report elaborates on the large food
output in 1910 and notes the "unusually high export prices." 28
Otherinstances of the influence of home demand are the FEQ
trough in 1882 and the peaks in 1905 and 1911 (Tables 31 and 32).
The timing •of turns in food export prices relative to quantity
turns also suggests that the DB•C had some inverse effect on food ex-
ports. Most food export price (FEP) turns match unlike FEQ turns
while only a few are near like ones. (Out of seventeen FEP turns,
twelve match unlike and three match like FEQ turns.) Two out of
the three instances in which price and quantity move in the same
direction are due to similar change in world demand. And in the
majority of instances such reversals of prices are associated with like
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reversals •in business. Altogether there are eight out of a total of
twenty-three FEQ turns which correspond to both unlike FEP and
unlike DBC turns. This may be compared with the ratio of fourteen
out of twenty-five CEQ turns of the same description. Home demand,
it may be concluded, plays a lesser role in food than in crude
materials exports. Nevertheless, it also contributes to changes in the
direction of food sales.
But there is still another type of food export turn which needs to
be discussed, a type not encountered in the analysis of finished man-
ufactures and crude materials. Tables 31 and 32 show two FEQ
peaks and three troughs which are not associated with WIC turns and
yet are located at like DBC turns. Moreover, these curious peaks and
troughs match opposite turns in food prices. The explanation is
to. be sought in the relation of business cycles and exports that we
usually disregard because of its unimportance in the United States
during the period under discussion. This is the impact of exports
on business activity. Some business revivals in the late nineteenth
century have always been attributed to a surge of food exports due
to the coincidence of a rich American harvest with a poor foreign
one. It is these crop revivals which stand out so clearly in the tables.
In 1888 and 1891, crop troughs brought price peaks and business
cycle troughs, while the situation was the reverse in 1887 and 1890.
These findings are confirmed and, in turn, support the views long
held by economic historians.
The main instance regarded as crop revival in the literature within
our period is the trough of 1891. (The 1879 trough is not included
in this analysis.) It is described as follows by Mitchell: "As in 1879,
the country was suddenly lifted from depression to prosperity by
the concurrence of bad harvests in Europe and abundant harvests
in America." 29
RendigsFels regards 1891 as the only occasion where a general
upturn, was caused by crop conditions: "On three occasions, crop
conditions exerted a powerful stimulus. All three occurred in the
vicinity of a lower turning point. In 1879 and 1897, contraction of
business had already ended before favorable conditions in the United
States combined with poor crops abroad to give a strong push to
an expansion that otherwise might have been weak and slow. In.
1891 crop conditions may have caused the upturn itself." 30
Itcan be seen from Table 32 that the 1891 FEQ trough is, indeed,
29BusinessCycles, Berkeley, 1913, p. 51.
3°RendigsFels, American Business Cycles, 1865—97, Chapel Hill, 1959, p. 220.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 163
one of. the rare cases where an export trough matches a domestic
business cycle trough despite the absence of a world trough. The
price peak which follows shortly upon the quantity trough confirms
the attribution of the latter to the supply side. The crop revival
hypothesis requires, furt.her, that not only the quantity but also the
value of food exports should experience an upturn. This requirement
too is met by the findings. Despite the price peak, there is a deep
trough in the value of food exports in 1891.
The second of the above-mentioned cases of coincidence of a FEQ
and a DBC trough, in 1888, has received little attention in the liter-
ature due to the mildness of the 1888 business recession. Fels, how-
ever, mentions crops ("good crops at home, not so good crops
abroad") as one of three factors responsible for the business revival.81
That in this instance, also, rising sales are due primarily to greater
output, not to greater foreign demand, is shown by the decline of
prices which set in shortly after the export trough.
The DBC trough of 1897 has often been interpreted in the same
way as that of 1891.32 Fels has objected to this view and his argument
is upheld by the findings on export. turns. No trough is listed at
this point. Exports merely resumed the steep rise which had been
interrupted for one or two quarters.
In sum, some turns in FEQ are associated with opposite turns
in the DEC due to the influence of domestic demand. Others occur
near like DBC turns due to the influence of foreign demand. And a
third type is again relatedlikeDEC turns due to the influence
of these exports on business. These different relations can be picked
up by the foregoing analysis but not by conformity indexes and
correlations according to which FEQ were unrelated to DBC (see
Chapter 6).
Practically all turns in the value of food exports (FEV) coincide
with those in quantity. Most of the few exceptions are due to diver-
gent decisions on turning points induced by very slight discrep-
ancies between the two series. Only in a few instances is this agree-
ment in the timing of value and quantity turns explained by parallel
price changes and like price turns. For the most part, value turns
up (down) when quantity does, despite an accompanying downturn
31 Ibid., p.161. That the FEQ trough lags behind the DBC trough by one
quarter does not contradict this interpretation since there is practically no change
in the series between the two quarters and since the turn in food exports value
did coincide with the DBC turn.
82 See, e.g.,Mitchell, Business Cycles, pp. 60 and 63; Financial Review, New
York, 1898; F. W. Taussig, International Trade, New York, 1927, p. 290.164 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
(upturn) of prices. This means, of course, that the price movement
is milder than the opposite change in quantity. On those occasions
in which both a turn in foreign demand and an opposite turn in
domestic demand are factors in the FEQ turn, the moderate ampli-
tude of the price change may be explained by the offsetting of the
two changes. For instance, when foreign demand begins to rise while
home demand begins to fall, one would except a large rise in exports
but only a mild drop in price. When no turn in WIC coincides, with
the FEQ turn, however, it must be concluded that the foreign de-
mand for U.S. food exports must have been more responsive, to
price changes, at least at certain times in the 1879—1913 period, than
would have been expected.
9. Relation Between Food Export Turns and
Domestic Business Cycle Turns, 1920—63
Even after World War I, there were still a few cases when a peak or
trough in domestic demand contributed to a trough or peak in food
exports. More than half of the FEQ turns in the interwar period are
close to opposite DBC turns, and four of them are also associated
with opposite price, turns—namely, the FEQ troughs of 1920, 1923,
and 1936, and the peak in 1921. Contemporary comments refer to
"lower prices elsewhere" or to "higher price range in the U.S. than
in world markets" as an explanation for small exports before the
1923 and 1936 export troughs.33
In the era of agricultural surpluses after World War II, inverse
effects of domestic demand on exports are not to be expected any
longer, and FEQ turns accordingly are no longer to be found near
opposite DBC turns. The only instance in which rising prices sup-
ported by rising domestic demand may have contributed to .a down-
turn in FEQ occurs in 1947. Even then, however, the main factor
is the reversal in foreign demand due to the recovery of foreign agri-
culture and the exhaustion of foreign dollar resources.34
With the weakened role of home demand, the timing of 'food ex-
port turns may be expected to depend mainly on world demand.
Tables 33 and 34 show, indeed, that all FEQ turns after World War
83 See Commerce Yearbook, Washington, 1923, p. 485, and Foreign Trade of the
United States, Trade Promotion Series #174, Washington, 1936, p. 2. A two-month
shipping tie-up in the Pacific may have caused a slight shift in the FEQ trough
in 1936.
34 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade of the United States,
1936—49, Washington, 1951, pp. IX and XI.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 165
II correspond to WIC turns. However, the intervals are rather long,
and the FEQ troughs in 1954 and 1958 match the DBC troughs more
closely than the troughs in WIG. At first it may appear strange that
food exports turn up more nearly when U.S. business revives than
when world trade revives. The. explanation isthat a new factor
determining export turns has entered the picture—the government
surplus disposal program.
In both 1954 and 1958, government intervention, spurred by reces-
sion, became effective shortly before the business upturn. In the
earlier case, a new surplus disposal program was instituted; in the
later one, the existing program, which had slowed down in the
preceding year, was speeded up. The risein world trade which
started in 1953 failed to give a lift to food exports, and they began
to rise only a year later in consequence of the new program. GATT
ascribes the total increase from 1954 to 11955 to this factor.35
While they had lagged behind the WIG in 1954, food exports led
the 1959 upturn in world imports by one year. The near coinci-
dence of the FEQ trough with the 1958 DBG trough is again due
to government action. A temporary slowing down in the disposal
program was followed by renewed efforts, which resulted in heavy
shipments to India countries.36
The government thus contributed to the positive correlation of
exports and U.S. business cycles in the 1950's. When this interven-
tion is called a new factor in export turns, however, one exception
must be made. There was one occasion in the 1930's when govern-
action caused coincidence of food exports and business cycle
troughs. This was at the end of 1933 when the Wheat Disposal Pro-
gram caused a sudden lift in previously stagnating exports.37
To summarize, despite erratic harvest influences, food export turns
in the interwar period, as in the period before 1913, are in most
cases associated with like turns in world imports or unlike turns in
the domestic business cycle. In contrast to earlier years, however,
FEQ turns which cause, and are therefore associated with, like DBC
turns are not found in later years. After World War II there is a
further change. Food export peaks are again accounted for by peaks
in world demand, but troughs now show a new relation to domestic
business troughs, a closer one than could be explained by the coinci-
35 GATT, International Trade, 1955, Geneva, 1956, p. 19.
36 Survey of Current Business, December 1958, pp. 17 and 19.
37 U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade of the United States, 1933, Trade



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.168 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
dence of the latter and world troughs. This new relation is due to
the intervention of the government which, spurred on by domestic
recession, effected an uptur.n in these exports around the time of
the domestic business trough.
10. Explanation of Timing of Turns in
Total Exports, 1879—1913
The insight gained into the factors causing the major classes of export
goods to reverse their direction of change can now be put to use
to explain •the turns in total exports. Nearly all of these in 1879—
1913 are due to turns in crude materials exports, in food exports, or
both. Of the nineteen peaks and troughs in total export quantity
(TEQ) which are covered by the analysis, ten coincide roughly with
a peak or trough in both crude materials and food exports; another
eight coincide with one or the other of the two classes. Exports of fin-
ished manufactures, on the other hand, contribute only rarely to a
turn in total exports in this period.
But CEQ and FEQ turns are only a necessary, not a sufficient, con-
dition for the occurrence of TEQ turns. Only about half of •the
classturns cause simultaneous TEQ turns, while the remainder
either lead or lag by more than a quarter or are not near a like
TEQ turn at all. In order to understand the relative importance
of the several causal factors in TEQ turns, one must know, there-
fore, which types of CEQ and FEQ turns are and which 'are not
reproduced in the total.
Comparisons of Tables 25, 26, 31, 32, 35, and 36 reveal that there
is a significant difference in this respect between turns due to changes
in world demand and turns due to the domestic business cycle. While
the great majority of those peaks and troughs in CEQ and FEQ which
are ascribed to peaks and troughs in the WIC reappear in total exports,
the same does not hold for CEQ and FEQ turns corresponding to
inverse DBC turns. Here the findings on troughs differ from those
on peaks. When a downturn in CEQ and FEQ is due to the inverse
effect of the domestic cycle, it is typically not reflected in a downturn
of total exports. Every upturn in FEQ, on the other hand, and five
out of eight upturns in CEQ have their counterparts in TEQ.
The reason for the relatively weak influence of inverse CEQ and
FEQ peaks on TEQ peaks (and to some extent of inverse CEQ
troughs on TEQ troughs) is often not their small amplitude but












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 171
fail to cause turns in TEQ do not coincide with each other. On
the other hand, most of the turns caused by the WIC occur at about
the same time in CEQ and FEQ, and hence also in TEQ. In other
words, reversals in world demand, because of their simultaneous ef-
fect on all classes of exports, are usually reflected in turns of the
total. Similarly, the strong and rapId effect of some downturns in
the DBC caused upturns in both export classes and, consequently,
in the total. On the other hand, the gradual impact of rising domestic
demand following upon a domestic business cycle trough usually
affects crude materials at a somewhat different time than foods. In
these cases TEQ tends to exhibit minor peaks not recognized as
cyclical turns, as for instance, in 1885, 1889, 1895, 1905, 1909, and
1912 (Chart 2).
Though the inverse effect of the domestic cycle, thus, is less often
responsible for peaks in total exports than itis for peaks in the
component classes, it is still sufficient—together with some turns in
world demand and some turns in crops at opposite DBC turns—
for about half of all TEQ turns to occur at unlike turns in the
DBC. This result stands out more sharply when itis remembered
that there are only two cases of, TEQ turns matching like DBC
turns that are not due to nearby WIC turns—the peak in 1887 and
the trough in 1888—both of which are due to the effect of food exports
on domestic business as discussed above.
The extent to which turns in total exports are affected by domestic
demand or supply isalso revealed by the timing of total export
prices (TEP). The relation of TEQ peaks and troughs to troughs
and peaks in TEP is similar to that between FEQ and FEP and
much less close than that between CEQ and CEP. About half of all
turns in total quantity match unlike turns in total prices, but the
relation is closer at TEQ troughs than at TEQ peaks (Tables 35 and
36).
The former are, as a rule, associated with downturns in TEP. Of
nine TEQ troughs, six coincide roughly with TEP peaks, two others
with minor TEP peaks, and none with a TEP trough. Thus, TEQ
typically begins to rise when a fall in domestic demand or a larger
crop causes prices to weaken. The role of domestic demand in this
weakening is attested by the fact that, in five of the seven instances
in which a TEQ trough matches a TEP peak, there is also a peak in
the DBC. (Conversely, half of all DBC peaks are characterized by
TEQ troughs and TEP peaks.)
In none of the instances in which an upturn in world demand172 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
aided the upturn in total exports was its effect strong enough to
bring about a simultaneous recovery of prices. On the contrary,
declining domestic demand and/orlarger crop were able to force
prices down despite the expansion in foreign demand.
Downturns in TEQ are less frequently related to price troughs than
TEQ upturns are to price peaks. Only four out of ten export peaks
match price troughs, while two even match price peaks. Thus, the
unfavorable effect of expanding domestic demand is not as clearly
revealed by the behavior of prices as the favorable effect of con-
tracting domestic demand is. The reason may be, in some instances,
that in the period of secular price decline domestic expansion. merely
caused. this decline to slow down but not to reverse itself so that
no price troughs occurred. In some instances, also a downturn In
world demand occurred at about the time of the TEQ peak and
contributed to the downward tendency of prices. At any rate, the be-
havior of prices confirms that the inverse effect of the DBC plays a
lesser role at peaks than at troughs of total exports.
Only about one-half of the turns in total export value (TEV)
coincide roughly with TEQ turns. The discrepancies are, however,
in several instances due to slight variations between the two series,
double turns, or questionable seasonal corrections. When thisis
taken into account by recognizing minor or alternative turns in a
few cases, it appears that the main real difference between value
and quantity turns stems from the rising price trend prevailing
around the turn of the century. This causes value troughs to lead and
value peaks to lag behind their quantity counterparts in a few in-
stances. Despite these differences, however, the explanation of quan-
tity turns holds, in general, for value turns too.
Having traced the turns in total exports to those in their compo-
nents and thereby gained an understanding of the role of the causal
factors behind them, we can now explain the peculiar location of
TEV turns in U.S. business cycles which previously could not be
accounted Turns in total exports, 1879—1913, we found, are cer-
tainly not randomly distributed in domestic business cycles. Peaks are
found, for instance, in six out of seven consecutive business expan-
sions, while troughs cluster around DBC peaks or troughs. Although
not irregular, however, the timing of export turns in domestic busi-
ness cycles differs from that of turns in other economic activities.
While in most time series peaks tend to cluster in one stage of
38Seemy American Exports During BusinessCycles,1879—1958,Occasional
Paper 76, New York, NBER, 1961.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 178
the business cycle and troughs in another, export peaks tend to
occur in two quite different stages, and the same goes for troughs.
The first and more frequent set of turns are peaks which lag be-
hind DBC troughs by about a year and export troughs located
shortly before or at DBC peaks. A second and smaller set of export
peaks is found in domestic contractions and a second set of troughs
at domestic troughs. These two locations correspond, as the preced-
ing analysis has disclosed, to two causal factors. The first set of turns,
the export peak in mid expansion and trough at the DBC peak, is
due largely to the inverse effect of the DBC (aided sometimes by
an inverse WIC and sometimes by an inverse crop cycle). The second
set of turns, the export peak in midcontraction and trough at the
DBC trough, is due to the impact of the WIC, whose peaks tend to
lag behind DBC peaks while some of its troughs are close to domestic
ones.
Thus, as a rule, export rises come to an end either after a stretch
of domestic expansion and due to its adverse effects, or due to a
downturn in world demand occurring during domestic contraction.
A fall in exports, on the other hand, is terminated either by a drop
in domestic demand at the DBC peak or by a rise in foreign demand
at a WIC trough which coincides with a DBC trough.
The regularities found in the timing of turns in total exports rela-
tive to U.S. business cycles can thus be attributed, in part, to the
direct impact of these business cycles on exports and, in part, to
regularities in the timing of turns in world demand relative to U.S.
business cycles.
11. Explanation of Timing of Turns
in Total Exports, 1920—63
In the later period, turns in total exports roughly coincide with
turns in finished manufactures exports about as frequently as with
those in any of the other commodity classes. In other words, because
oftheirgreaterinstability,exportsof semimanufactures, crude
materials, and foods cause turns in total exports about as often as
the much larger but more stable exports of finished manufactures.
There is, however, a difference between peaks and troughs in this
respect. A downturn in total exports is due most often to semimanu-
factures and/or foods (there is only a single TEQ peak which does
not roughly coincide with a SEQ and/or FEQ peak), and least often174 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
to finished manufactures. An upturn in total exports, on the contrary,
is less frequently due to foods than to any of the other classes.
About half the turns in each commodity class coincide roughly with
a turn in total exports. As in the earlier period, these coinciding
turns are for the most part those caused by reversals in foreign de-
mand, while turns due to the inverse impact of the DBC are mostly
not reflected in TEQ. Of the thirty-eight turns in one or another
class of exports which we have attributed mainly to the WIC, twenty-
nine coincide roughly with turns in TEQ in 1920—60. But of twenty-
three class turns inverse to the DBC, only six coincide with TEQ
turns.
The explanation for the different effect of WIG and DBC turns
on total exports is similar to that for the earlier period: foreign de-
mand affects all types of exportsabout the same time, while the
influence of domestic demand is timed differently in different classes.
Moreover, and most important jn the latter period, exports of fin-
ished manufactures do not turn at all near unlike turns in the DBC.
Hence, even simultaneous inverse turns in crude materials and foods
sometimes fail to produce a turn in the total due to an opposing
movement in finished manufactures. This happened, for instance,
in 1921, 1936, and 1945. However, variations in exports of semi-
manufactures differ less from those in finished manufactures than
crude materials and foods. Therefore, most inverse turns in SEQ
arereflectedin at least minor peaks and troughs of TEQ.
Since the number of reversals at opposite turns in domestic demand
is smaller in each class of exports in the later compared with the
earlier period, and since a large proportion of the inverse class turns
that do occur is not reflected in total exports, there remain, after
1920, only a few TEQ peaks and troughs matching troughs and
peaks in the DBC (Tables 37 and 38). Two such instances are the
TEQ peak and trough in 1924 1925; two others come in 1947
and 1948. The case of the 1947 peak is exceptional insofar asit
was at that time the deliberate policy of the government to reduce
exports by tightening controlsorder to ease pressures on limited
domestic
Thus the inverse effect of demand plays, after World
War I, but a minor role in reversals of total exports. The meaning
of this finding should not be overlooked. Judging by the record
of the last thirty or forty years, one need not fear that growth of

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 177
total exports will be stopped by an upturn of domestic business,
nor should one hope to halt a fall in exports by inducing a downturn
in the home economy. Peaks and troughs in the DBC cannot even
be expected to prevent exports from turning in conformity with
world demand. Most TEQ turns since 1929 and all of them since
1949 are associated with WIC turns despite the frequent proximity
of the latter to like turns in the DBC.
The timing of peaks and troughs in total export prièes relative
to those in TEQ also shows the weakness of the DBC's influence in
the later period. While quantity troughs before 1913 were associated
typically with price peaks, they tend to match price troughs in the
latter years. In only three of the eleven instances covered did a down-
turn in prices contribute to the upturn in quantity, while there are
six matching price and quantity troughs. More particularly, begin-
fling with 1938, five of the six TEQ troughs are associated with TEP
troughs. On all these occasions, the effect of the world import cycle
was strong enough to permit both quantities and prices to revive.
The situation at TEQ peaks is not quite symmetrical to that at
troughs. They are less frequently accompanied by TEP peaks, but
neither do they match TEP troughs after 1934. No downturn in total
exports, in other words, can be attributed to an upturn in prices
during the past thirty-odd years. In the interwar period, however,
this. relationship still resembled somewhat that of the period before
World War I. Three of the six TEQ peaks match TEP troughs, but
the latter are in two instances due to factors other than the DBC.
Due partly to the predominantly positive relation between price
and quantity movements and partly to the relative mildness of price
fluctuations, the value of total exports turned together with export
quantity in all instances after World War II and in fifteen out of
•twenty-one cases during the whole period of 1920—60. The few oc-
casions on which there is a short lead or lag of value over quantity
are due to slight discrepancies between the series. The only real dif-
ference occurs at the TEQ trough of 1932 and peak of 1934, which
are not reflected in TEV due to offsetting price changes. Thus, the
explanation of turns in total export quantity also applies to their
value.
The analysis may again be used to explain the location of turns
in total exports in U.S. business cycles. There is a considerable shift
here between the earlier period and 1920—60, particularly for export
troughs. Whereas exports used to revive most often in the vicinity
of domestic business peaks before 1913, they now tend to do so near178 Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Exports
domestic troughs. Seven of the eleven TEQ troughs are within two
quarters of a DBC trough, and an eighth one lags by three quarters.
In most instances, these upturns are associated with like ones in world
demand. However, government policiesalso play acertain, role.
The timing of the farm program contributed to the recovery of ex-
ports at the domestic troughs of 1954 and 1958, and the devaluation
to that of
Of the three remaining instances in which total exports take a
favorable turn at a DBC stage other than the trough, two are
ciated with DBC peaks. They are manifestations of what remains of
the inverse relation which earlier was the rule. The third case, the
export trough of 1934, lags behind the DBC trough by almost two
years due to the aforementioned double trough of world imports
in those years.
The location of total export peaks in domestic business cycles does
not differ as radically between the earlier and' later periods as that
of troughs. Six of the ten more recent TEQ peaks are less than
one year away from a domestic business peak. Most of these are
caused by WIC peaks. They correspond to that set of the earlier
period which lagged behind DBC peaks and thus came during
domestic contraction. Since the earlier period's regular lags of world
peaks at U.S. peaks have become mixed leads and lags in the later
years, the position of export peaks has changed likewise. Thus, the
WIG and TEQ peaks of 1937 and 1949 lag behind DBC peaks as
before, while in 1929 and 1957 world trade and exports turned
earlier than domestic business.
Two of the three remaining TEQ peaks come in the course of U.S.
expansions, and their location thus is similar to that of the more
numerous set of the earlier period. However, the causal factors are
different now. The main reason for the downturns of 1934 and 1952
was not rising domestic demand but the collapse of an agricultural
export program in the former case and the downturn of world de-
mand after the Korean War in the latter one. If these cases are re-
garded as exceptions, one must conclude that a downturn in total
U.S. exports is more likely in the neighborhood of a domestic busi-
ness peak than near a trough.
In sum, then, there has been a shift of both the peaks and the
troughs in total exports into the vicinity of like turns in U.S. business
4°Theonly TEQ trough which occurred at a DBC trough but was not due
either to a WIC trough or to government policies is the trough of 1927. This was
largely attributable to crop failure.When and Why Exports Reverse Their Course 179
cycles. The main reason for this shiftis,as explained above, the
weakening of the inverse effect of the DBC on exports. This ac-
counts for the absence of export troughs at peaks of later business
cycles and for the occurrence of only two export peaks in the course
of expansion in this period. Another reason for the shiftis•the
closer correspondence of world and domestic cycle turns in the later
period relative to the earlier one. This pulls those export turns that
are due to WIG turns toward like DBC turns. A third, if minor,
factor operating in the same direction was represented by some gov-
ernment programs which on a few occasions• caused total exports
to turn up at about the time of a business cycle trough.